How to Fix Iraq and Defeat ISIS

There seems to be great doubt about what to do about “ISIS” or the “Islamic State”.  Few think that the United States has a coherent or winning short-term or long-term approach.  Many fear a creeping increase of U.S. involvement that will eventually involve more and more U.S. and other allied soldiers on the ground in Iraq and Syria.  We see this fear being realized with the recent news of U.S. Special Forces now being deployed to Syria.  Others fear that Russia or Iran will gain increasing influence through their growing actions against ISIS as compared to the overall limited action by the United States.  The U.S. policy has been to “degrade” and then “destroy” ISIS is doing neither.  Here is what needs to be done:

First, we need to take into account that Iraq, like many other nation states in the region, was artificially created from the line-drawing of outside powers.  In this, case the British were in charge of restructuring the Middle East after World War I.  And, what is known as Iraq today was never a political or social unit that should have been lumped together into a state. Rather, it was created out of Ottoman provinces that had previously reflected the distinctions between the Shias and Sunnis in the region (if not fully the Kurds).  The post-WWI created boundaries of Iraq met the then goals of the British, but had nothing to do with any sort of natural relationships among the peoples of what is now called Iraq.  That is not a new analysis and certainly professional historians have more to say about this than I can.  But, it is fair to say that this brief of Iraqi history is generally accepted as correct by knowledgeable observers.

Second, we need to acknowledge that, practically, Iraq is broken into three distinct regions.  The current reality is that the Kurds are, for all intents and purposes, running their own country in northeast and much of the north of Iraq.  And, the Shias clearly dominate the south and southeast and the Sunnis are dominant in the west, including the Anbar province and other areas in the northwest of the country.  For convenience, we can call these areas Kurdistan, Shiastan and Sunnistan. 

Third, we need to recognize the reality of the impossibility of these three areas ever being put back together.  The Sunnis, under Saddam Hussein were in control of the country and the levers of power.  As is common in the region, there was little room for other ethnicities or any sort of “loyal opposition”.  As such, the Shias, despite being a majority, were significantly discriminated against and oppressed.  Quite naturally for this area of the world, once the Shias became dominate after elections following the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Shias then turned on the Sunnis.  The previous Shia Prime Minister al Maliki could have been a leader against such secular division, but instead he significantly worsened it.  The current Shia Prime Minister Al Abadi is less secular in his approach, but it is too late.  The damage is done.  The Kurds are never coming back into the fold (most likely they never were) but the Sunnis have concluded that there will never be justice and fair treatment under a Shia-dominated Iraqi government (and given the demographics of Iraq, the Shias will always dominate).  For this reason, the Sunnis are hesitant to fight with the Shia-dominated Iraqi military against the Islamic Nazis because even a successful fight would result in greater Shia dominance and control in Sunnistan.  So, although the Sunnis generally don’t favor ISIS, many Sunnis conclude that if they can’t govern themselves they may be better off under the ISIS than under the Shia-dominated Iraqi government.

So, the only realistic approach to resolving the secular division in Iraq and creating a situation in which the Sunnis will fight against ISIS is to formally divide the country into what is already the fact on the ground.  That is, have the people on the ground and the world agree to the division of Iraq into three truly independent countries - Kurdistan, Shiastan and Sunnistan – each formally recognized by all major and regional powers and the United Nations.  Details of this may be difficult, especially with respect to certain cities and regions where the ethnic majorities have been diluted based on political considerations of whoever was in charge of Iraq from time to time.  And, there may well be some aspects of a new partition with some of the negative consequences that happened in 1947 when India and Pakistan came into being.  However, those negative consequences and difficulties could hardly be worse than what has been happened on the ground in Iraq over the last several years. There is also the question of the oil.  But, the simple answer has to be that Kurdistan, Shiastan and Sunnistan each will own and control the natural resources in their respective territories.  Sunnistan would have less oil that Kurdistan and Shiastan, but the Sunnis see virtually no benefit of the oil in Iraq as it is.  A secure and functional Sunnistan would be more valuable to the Sunnis that any share of the oil that might come about from some three-way agreement about how to share the oil (which probably could never be reached or complied with anyway).

The formalization of this reality would have the general benefit of significantly reducing the secularism that has been destroying people’s lives in Iraq.  But, it would also provide the best framework for a realistic strategy for defeating ISIS.  The reasoning for such a conclusion is based on the history of the Awakening Movement that was largely responsible for defeating Al Qaeda in Sunnistan in 2005.  At that point, the Sunni tribes in Sunnistan realized that living under Al Qaeda rule was not acceptable and so instead of fighting U.S. forces the tribes agreed to fight with U.S. forces to defeat Al Qaeda.  Unfortunately, instead of being recognized by the Shia-dominated government as part of the overall solution in Iraq, the courageous and successful efforts of the Sunni tribes during the Awakening Movement worked against the Sunnis because the Shia-dominated government then was able to further oppress the Sunnis in Sunnistan after Al Qaeda had been defeated and was no longer a threat to the Shia-dominated Iraqi military.  As such, the Sunnis this time around have little incentive to fight and defeat ISIS because their experience has shown that such an effort will not ultimately benefit them.  One might argue that it would be different now under Prime Minister Al Abadi, but the Sunnis are not going to believe that in the short term and ISIS will continue its murderous ways.

The formal division of Iraq would have the Kurds controlling the current region already known as Kurdistan. Sunnistan would include the entire Anbar province and some points north. That would need to be negotiated some with the Kurds.  But, with both Kurdistan and Sunnistan formally being recognized as nation states, the Kurds and the Sunnis would have a strong incentive to come to an agreement.  That leaves Shiastan, which would cover all other areas of Iraq, including Baghdad.  Kurdistan already has its own capital and doesn’t need Baghdad.  Sunnistan would need to declare its own capital, but that is likely to be Ramadi, which is already the provincial capital and has the benefits of being close to Baghdad, the Shiastan capital.  The recognition of the three countries would need to be conditioned on fully negotiated treaties on trade, security and other matters.  Sure, Iran, Turkey and others have some reasons to not support this approach, but they have more reasons to agree to it.  In any event, the members of the United Nations Security Council do not need Iran’s and Turkey’s consent to such recognition.

In addition to resolving the secular issues that are essentially incurable under the current ethnic, political and geographical concept that is called Iraq, this then leads to a credible strategy for defeating the ISIS.  That is, if the Sunnis in Sunnistan see that fighting ISIS means that the Sunnis actually are fighting for themselves and not for a Shia government, the sentiments that led to the Awakening Movement and the successful defeat of Al Qaeda in Iraq can be repeated.  The international community would also need to provide all military and economic support to defeat ISIS and to re-build Sunnistan into a functional society with a responsive and functional government.  An important part of the international community’s support from Sunnistan would need to come from the Gulf Cooperation Council states, especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.  Those states have the financial strength and the military muscle to significantly support both the fight and the rebuilding of Sunnistan.  They also have the desire to defeat ISIS and to see a stable Sunni-dominated country carved out of Iraq.

Finally, if the Sunnis and the international community could defeat ISIS in what is now known as Iraq, then the remaining threat from ISIS would be focused only in Syria, a much smaller territory.  At that point, the ISIS becomes a much smaller issue geographically, its resources diminished, the recruitment of foreign fighters likely significantly reduced as the movement is falling apart and Sunnis in the region see an international commitment to the fair treatment of Sunnis in the region of Sunnistan.  It would also offer an opportunity for Iran and the Sunni-dominated Arab states to work together, which could then lead to more trust and confidence to work on other regional issues. 

What is now needed is for the United States, the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council to make such a proposal and present it in the United Nations and to the parties in Iraq so that negotiations and planning can start in order to end the secular divisions in Iraq and at the same time have a plausible strategy for defeating ISIS.